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THE POTENTIAL FOR STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO
PROMOTE THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PRACTICE
LAINIE RUTKOW* AND STEPHEN P. TERET**
The Attorneys General of the 50 states have considerable legal authority to
protect the public’s health, yet their role in the development of health policy is
often under-appreciated or misunderstood. This article analyzes state
Attorneys’ General current powers and provides a logic model that illustrates
how the use of these powers can lead to the protection and promotion of the
public’s health. The article then provides four brief case studies to
demonstrate how state Attorneys General have used their varied powers to
influence policy-making and benefit the public’s health. In addition, this
article offers a roadmap for research that could be conducted to better
understand the association between state Attorneys’ General actions and the
protection of the public’s health. The article concludes with a series of
recommendations intended to enhance state Attorneys’ General ability to
protect the public’s health, along with suggestions for future research in this
area.

* Assistant Professor and Assistant Director, Center for Law and the Public’s Health, Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health; J.D., New York University School of Law; Ph.D.,
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health; B.A., Yale University.
** Professor and Director, Center for Law and the Public’s Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School
of Public Health; B.A., St. Lawrence University.
267

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

268

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX:267

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 269

II.

LOGIC MODEL OF THE ABILITY OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO
PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH ................................... 270
A. Grants of Authority ......................................................................... 272
B. Litigation and Law Enforcement ..................................................... 273
C. Investigative Activities .................................................................... 275
D. Law and Policy Reform ................................................................... 276
E. Mediating Factors ........................................................................... 277
F. Outputs: Improved Public Health ................................................... 278

III. PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS ACHIEVED BY SAGS ................................... 279
A. Tobacco Control Litigation and the Master Settlement
Agreement ....................................................................................... 279
B. Rulemaking to Prevent Firearm-Related Injuries and Deaths ........ 282
C. Investigation into Deceptive Food Labeling Practices ................... 284
D. Working with the Federal Government to Address Illegal
Marketing of Pharmaceuticals ........................................................ 287
IV. SAGS’ EFFECTIVENESS IN PROMOTING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH ............ 290
V.

SAGS’ CURRENT AND FUTURE ABILITY TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC’S
HEALTH .................................................................................................. 293

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING SAGS’ ABILITY TO IMPROVE
THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH ........................................................................... 297
VII. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 300

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011] POTENTIAL FOR STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO PROMOTE PUBLIC HEALTH

269

I. INTRODUCTION1
In the United States, the chief legal officer of each state is known as the
Attorney General.2 State Attorneys General (SAGs) can take a wide range of
actions on behalf of their state and the public interest through law enforcement,
litigation, investigatory activities, and law and policy reform work.
Forty-three states elect their SAG by popular vote.3 In five states, the SAG
is appointed by the governor.4 Maine’s SAG is elected by a vote among the
state’s legislature,5 and Tennessee’s SAG is appointed by the state’s Supreme
Court.6 Requirements for SAGs’ age, in-state residency, bar licensure, and
term lengths vary among the states.7 All SAGs belong to the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), which facilitates cooperation
among the SAGs through meetings, training opportunities, and projects.8
SAGs have broad powers that allow them to protect and promote the
public’s health.9 In recent years SAGs have successfully tackled numerous
public health issues, including end-of-life care, alcohol policy, tobacco control,
prescription drug abuse, Medicaid fraud, and hospital mergers.10 This list is
1. The research associated with this article was funded by Public Health Law Research, a
national program of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The authors would like to thank
Hugh Carlson for his research assistance. While this article was being drafted, the authors spoke
with several individuals who provided useful feedback. The authors would like to thank: Kelly
Brownell of the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale University; Abbe Gluck of
Columbia Law School; Cindy Lott of the National State Attorneys General Program at Columbia
Law School; Jennifer Pomeranz of the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale
University; Jim Tierney of the National State Attorneys General Program at Columbia Law
School; and Marlene Trestman of the Maryland Office of the Attorney General. Finally, the
authors would like to thank reviewers within the Public Health Law Research Program for helpful
insights and comments on an earlier draft of this article.
2. In addition, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana
Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands each have their own Attorney General. Current
Attorneys General, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/current-attorneysgeneral.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
3. About NAAG: The Attorneys General, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN.,
http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
4. The five states in which the governor appoints the SAG are Alaska, Hawaii, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming. Id.
5. About Attorney General William J. Schneider, OFF. OF THE ME. ATT’Y GEN.,
http://www.maine.gov/ag/about/message.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
6. Attorney General Robert E. Cooper, Jr., OFF. OF THE TENN. ATT’Y GEN. & REP.,
http://www.tennessee.gov/attorneygeneral/agcooperbio.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
7. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 20–23 (Emily Myers & Lynne Ross eds., 2007) [hereinafter POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES].
8. About NAAG, supra note 3.
9. See infra Part II.
10. NAAG Projects, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/projects.php
(last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
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not exhaustive and this article will not attempt to cover all the ways in which
SAGs can promote the public’s health; rather, it will provide selected examples
of SAGs’ use of different powers to address public health issues both within
their own states and, through collaboration, across jurisdictions.
While SAGs have considerable legal authority to protect the public’s
health, this important subject has not yet been fully explored. This article
begins with a discussion of SAGs’ powers and an explanation of how these
powers can be used to protect the public’s health. It then offers four
examples—tobacco control, firearms regulation, food labeling practices, and
pharmaceutical marketing—to demonstrate how SAGs have used their powers
to benefit the public’s health. The article then summarizes the limited,
empirical work examining the promotion of the public’s health by SAGs. In
light of these findings, the article offers an analysis of future actions SAGs can
take to promote the public’s health.
It concludes with a set of
recommendations intended to enhance SAGs’ abilities in this area, along with
suggestions for future research.
II. LOGIC MODEL OF THE ABILITY OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO
PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH
State Attorneys General can draw upon diverse powers to protect and
promote the health of their state’s population. Even without identifying every
aspect of public health available for protection, one can nevertheless classify
SAGs’ broad powers and explore what mediating factors might enhance or
detract from these powers to benefit the public’s health. These classifications
and findings result in a more nuanced understanding of how SAGs can use
their powers to impact particular areas of public health.
The relationship between SAGs’ powers and their ability to protect the
public’s health is depicted in Figure 1. As this logic model demonstrates, the
path from an SAG’s initial grant of legal authority to the demonstrable
protection of the public’s health involves important decision points, such as
which power an SAG will use, and significant mediators, such as the tenor of
the legal environment in which the SAG operates. By exploring each path
within Figure 1, a comprehensive description of an SAG’s ability to protect the
public’s health can be achieved.
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Grants of Authority

The law grants SAGs the authority to use certain powers to carry out the
requirements of their positions. This initial grant of legal authority can be
traced to three different sources: common law, state constitutions, and state
statutes. These powers are grounded in the common law, also known as judgemade or case law. NAAG has identified many SAG powers that are derived
from the common law, including “the duty to appear for and defend the state
and its agencies,” “the right to intervene in legal proceedings on behalf of the
public interest,” and “the authority to prosecute criminal activity, in the
absence of express legislative restriction.”11
Many scholars recognize State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corporation12 as the
case that best articulates the development of these common law powers.13 This
case originated in 1973, when Robert Shevin, Florida’s then Attorney General,
brought an antitrust suit against several large oil companies in federal court.14
The oil companies challenged Shevin’s authority to bring the suit since he had
not explicitly received authorization from the state of Florida to do so.15 In its
analysis of the Florida Attorney General’s powers, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals provided a detailed account of the origin of SAGs’ common law
powers:16
[SAGs’] duties and powers typically are not exhaustively defined by either
constitution or statute but include all those exercised at common law. There is
and has been no doubt that the legislature may deprive the attorney general of
specific powers; but in the absence of such legislative action, he typically may
exercise all such authority as the public interest requires. And the attorney
general has wide discretion in making the determination as to the public
17
interest.

In light of this analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that as Florida’s SAG,
Shevin had the power to bring the lawsuit in federal court on behalf of Florida
without receiving prior authorization from the state.18 Shevin has been

11. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 44–47.
12. Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976).
13. Justin G. Davids, State Attorneys General and the Client-Attorney Relationship:
Establishing the Power to Sue State Officers, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 365, 375–76
(2005); Peter Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys General
Can Enforce State Wage and Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 495, 508–09 (2006).
14. Florida ex rel. Shevin, 526 F.2d at 267–68.
15. Id. at 267–68.
16. Id. at 268–69.
17. Id. at 268–69.
18. Id.
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repeatedly cited to clarify SAGs’ powers, with particular emphasis on SAGs’
“vast” and “wide discretion” to bring lawsuits to protect the public interest.19
Some states have codified their SAG’s authority by explicitly mentioning
the SAG’s common law powers in a statute or the state’s constitution.20 For
example, according to Alabama’s state code, “[t]he attorney general shall have
and retain all of the powers, duties, and authority heretofore granted or
authorized by the constitution, statutory law, or the common law.”21 Most
state constitutions contain similar language regarding the SAG’s grant of
authority.22 A few states require the SAG to solely rely upon authority granted
by state statute rather than the common law.23 For instance, in In re Sharp’s
Estate, a case which challenged the Wisconsin SAG’s authority to intervene in
a lawsuit, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained that “Wisconsin, unlike
numerous states, has specifically circumscribed the powers and duties of the
office of the Attorney General . . . to those ‘prescribed by law.’”24
B.

Litigation and Law Enforcement

As the paths designated by the first number in Figure 1 demonstrate, an
initial grant of authority under the common law, state statutes, or a state’s
constitution allows an SAG to take certain well-established actions.25 These
actions fall within three general categories: 1) litigation and law enforcement;
2) investigative activities; and 3) law and policy reform. Within each of these
categories, SAGs can draw on a variety of powers to accomplish their aims.
All states grant their SAG the power to participate in litigation on behalf of
the state. For example, New Jersey offers a typical codification of this power:
“[The Attorney General] shall exclusively attend to and control all litigation
and controversies to which the State is a party or in which its rights and
interests are involved.”26 Due to the broad nature of SAGs’ litigation
responsibilities, many SAGs create specialized groups within their offices to
handle certain types of recurring litigation, such as consumer protection or

19. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distributors, Inc., 704 F.2d 125, 132 n.15
(4th Cir. 1983); Ohio v. United Transp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
20. Amy Dieterich, The Role of the State Attorney General in Preventing and Punishing
Hate Crimes Through Civil Prosecution: Positive Experiences and Possible First Amendment
Potholes, 61 ME. L. REV. 521, 524 (2009).
21. ALA. CODE § 36-15-1 (LexisNexis 2010).
22. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 38.
23. In re Sharp’s Estate, 217 N.W.2d 258, 262 (Wis. 1974); 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General
§ 7 (Supp. 2010).
24. In re Sharp’s Estate, 217 N.W.2d at 262.
25. Supra Figure 1.
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17A-4 (West 2010).
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environmental lawsuits.27 Because they control all litigation that involves the
State, SAGs are similarly responsible for representing their state’s agencies
when legal challenges arise. Accordingly, New Jersey’s statute provides a
representative example—it has codified the SAG’s responsibility to represent
state agencies when they are sued and when an agency initiates a lawsuit to
enforce the laws for which it is responsible.28
Under their common law authority, SAGs have the power to use litigation
as a tool to protect “the public interest”29 and will often rely on the doctrine of
parens patriae (“parent of the country”) to do so. Parens patriae authority
allows an SAG to bring litigation to “recover costs or damages incurred
because of behavior that threatens the health, safety, and welfare of the state’s
citizenry.”30 SAGs have used their parens patriae power to bring lawsuits in
diverse areas, such as securities and commodities and environmental law.31
In addition to initiating and participating in civil litigation, SAGs play an
important role in the enforcement of their state’s criminal law. The scope of an
SAG’s authority in this area varies significantly among the states. In Rhode
Island, the SAG has broad authority to prosecute criminal offenses, and is
required to submit an annual report to the state’s governor detailing these
activities.32 Connecticut’s Attorney General does not have the authority to
supervise legal matters concerning criminal prosecutions; rather, he is the chief
legal officer of the state for civil matters.33 In most states, however, the SAG’s
criminal law enforcement authority falls between these two extremes. Within
this continuum, some states, such as Michigan, grant the SAG statutory
authority to use the state police to assist “in any investigation or matter under
the jurisdiction of his or her department.”34 Many SAGs with significant
criminal law enforcement authority have even established criminal justice
divisions within their offices.35 For example, the Texas Attorney General’s
27. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 83; Consumer Protection Division,
MD. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.oag.state.md.us/consumer/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2011);
Environmental Protection Division, OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF VT., http://www.atg.state.vt.us/
issues/environmental-protection.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17A-4 (West 2010).
29. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 83; Victor E. Schwartz et al., Can
Governments Impose a New Tort Duty to Prevent External Risks? The “No-Fault” Theories
Behind Today’s High-Stakes Government Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923, 928
(2009).
30. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco
Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1863 (2000).
31. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 103.
32. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-9-2, 49-9-4, 49-9-12 (2007).
33. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-125 (2009).
34. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.6 (2008).
35. See, e.g., Preventing CRIME, DEL. ATT’Y GENERALS OFF., http://attorneygeneral.dela
ware.gov/crime/crimeprevent.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2011); Wyoming Attorney General’s
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Office contains five criminal law sections, including a criminal prosecutions
division and a Medicaid fraud control unit.36
C. Investigative Activities
In Figure 1, paths designated by the number 2 indicate that SAGs’
investigative activities can contribute to their litigation and law enforcement
efforts, as well as to their law and policy reform work.37 This is because, in
civil and criminal contexts, SAGs can conduct investigations into issues such
as “government misconduct . . . , criminal activity . . . , [and] issues of
substantial public interest.”38 For criminal investigations, most states grant
their Attorney General the ability to issue subpoenas to obtain testimony or
evidence.39
In some instances, an SAG will launch an investigation based on concerns
raised by the citizens of his or her state.40 The results of these investigations,
which are sometimes shared publicly through the issuance of reports, can
provoke litigation or other advocacy efforts to address the perceived wrong.41
However, the investigation’s findings may independently lead to change based
on recommendations contained within the SAG’s report.42 For example, in
2007, after Lyme disease advocacy groups approached Connecticut’s Attorney
General to contest two medical associations’ guidelines recommending against
long-term antibiotic treatment for Lyme disease, the SAG launched an
investigation to learn more about the development of these guidelines.43 The
investigation uncovered multiple conflicts of interest that may have prevented
objectivity among those who drafted the guidelines.44 As a result of the
investigation’s findings, the medical societies agreed to have their 2006 Lyme
disease recommendations reviewed by a panel of independent experts.45
Criminal Division, WYO. ATT’Y GEN., http://attorneygeneral.state.wy.us/crimpg.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2011).
36. Criminal Justice Division, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., http://www.oag.state.tx.us/criminal/
criminal.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2011).
37. Supra Figure 1.
38. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 14.
39. Id. at 308.
40. See generally AG’s in the News, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_
program/ag/AGsintheNews (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
41. Id.
42. E.g., Brenda Patoine, Guideline-Making Gets Tougher: Action by State Attorney General
Over Lyme Disease Guidelines Stirs Debate, 65 ANNALS NEUROLOGY A10 (2009).
43. Id.
44. AG’s in the News, supra note 40.
45. Press Release, Office of the Conn. Attorney Gen., Attorney General’s Investigation
Reveals Flawed Lyme Disease Guideline Process, IDSA Agrees to Reassess Guidelines, Install
Independent Arbiter (May 1, 2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/AG/cwp/view.asp?a=2795&q
=414284.
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D. Law and Policy Reform
Several of the most frequently used powers among SAGs fall within the
category of law and policy reform. As a state’s chief legal officer, an SAG is
frequently called upon to provide advice to the governor and administrative
agencies.46 This advice can pertain to any legal or policy issue.47 A related,
but separate, power involves an SAG’s issuance of opinions. Opinions are
solicited from an SAG by the governor or a state agency, with the expectation
that the SAG will provide a written response.48 For example, in 2008,
Maryland’s Attorney General issued an opinion, in response to a request by the
Comptroller of Maryland, to clarify whether Baltimore City could legally
implement a proposed regulation to restrict the sale of cheap cigars.49 While
opinions can be written in response to a broad range of inquiries, in general
SAGs’ opinions should not address issues that are currently being litigated,
hypothetical questions, or “issues unrelated to the requester’s duties . . . .”50
While an SAG’s opinion is not legally binding, it should be “entitled to
great weight” both by officers of the state and by the courts.51 SAGs can,
however, promulgate legally binding regulations or rules, using authority
granted to them by the state.52 For example, in Ohio, the Attorney General has
been granted rule-making authority for “charitable law, consumer protection,
crime victims services, criminal record checks, environmental background
investigation, and peace officer training.”53
In addition to utilizing their formal powers, SAGs can engage in advocacy
to promote change. Some SAGs do this by using the “bully pulpit” of their
office to make their views known or to bring attention to a particular issue.54

46. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General § 9 (2007).
47. See The Attorney General Opinion Process, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., https://www.oag.state.
tx.us/agency/weeklyag/weekly_columns_view.php?id=208 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
48. Lainie Rutkow & Stephen P. Teret, Role of State Attorneys General in Health Policy,
304 JAMA 1377, 1377 (2010).
49. Whether Baltimore City Health Code Regulation Concerning Sales of Cheap Cigars Is
Preempted by State Law, 93 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 149 (Md. 2008), available at http://www.oag.state.
md.us/Opinions/2008/93oag149.pdf.
50. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 76.
51. Napa Valley Educators’ Ass’n v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 194 Cal. App. 3d 243,
251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); cf. In re Proposal C. v. Kelley, 185 N.W.2d 9, 17 n.2 (Mich. 1971)
(“Although an opinion of the Attorney General is not a binding interpretation of law which courts
must follow, it does command the allegiance of state agencies.”).
52. See The Attorney General Opinion Process, supra note 47.
53. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF OHIO, RULE-MAKING PROCESS, available at
http://www.registerofohio.state.oh.us/pdfs/rmg/RMG_109_20031117.pdf.
54. Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615,
641–42 (2006); State Attorneys General, Nutrition, and Obesity, YALE RUDD CENTER FOR FOOD
POLICY & OBESITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/podcasts.aspx (search James
E. Tierney under Guest).
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This can be accomplished by issuing press releases, granting interviews, or
holding press conferences. An SAG can also raise awareness about a certain
topic by using his or her ability to convene individuals. For example, some
SAGs host summits to bring together experts in consumer protection, with the
goal of identifying and exploring areas in which SAGs could do a better job of
protecting the public.55 Finally, SAGs can use their collective force to engage
in advocacy that targets an industry or company. In 2007, twenty-nine SAGs
sent a letter to the Chief Executive Officer of Anheuser-Busch, “to express
[their] serious concern about [the] company’s promotion and sale of alcoholic
energy drinks . . . [which] are highly attractive to underage youth.”56 Several
weeks later, Anheuser-Busch announced that it would stop making Spykes™,
the alcoholic energy drink that the SAGs had targeted in their letter.57
For SAGs to ensure that the public benefits from their work, they must
take steps to share information about their offices’ efforts.58 To accomplish
this, every SAG works with a public information officer.59 These individuals
liaise with the media and share information, promoting the SAG’s advocacy
efforts and providing brief summaries of the SAG’s accomplishments and how
they have benefited the state’s citizens.60 Additionally, public information
officers disseminate pamphlets, reports, or other materials that an SAG creates
for the public.61 In doing so, they promote a dynamic relationship between the
SAG’s office and the individuals the SAG serves.
E.

Mediating Factors

In Figure 1, the path designated by the number 3 highlights the mediating
factors that can affect how the execution of an SAG’s powers will protect the
public’s health.62 The overall legal environment in which the SAG operates
can greatly influence his or her ability to bring about meaningful change. For
example, researchers have consistently found that effective implementation,

55. Consumer Protection Summit Panelists, OHIO ATT’Y GEN., (last visited Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/SpeakOutOhio/Events/Ohio-Consumer-Protection-Summit/
Consumer-Protection-Summit-Panelists.
56. Letter from G. Steven Rowe et al., Attorney Gen. of Me. et al., to August A. Busch IV,
President & Chief Exec. Officer, Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. (May 10, 2007), available at
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/Spykes.pdf.
57. David Kesmodel, Anheuser Abandons Spykes Drink, Citing Sales and Rejecting Critics,
WALL ST. J., May 18, 2007, at B3.
58. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General § 11 (2007).
59. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 108.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Supra Figure 1.
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“the process of translating a law into action,”63 is critical to the success of a
legal initiative. If an SAG’s efforts to protect the public’s health are not
implemented, then the SAG’s intended public health measures will likely not
be enforced. Because most SAGs are elected, their actions may be swayed by
the political will of the voters. This may make an SAG more or less likely to
vigorously pursue a particular public health issue, depending on its expected
popularity with the electorate. Similarly, if an SAG is working with an
unpopular governor, he or she may take actions to create perceived distance
from the governor. Here, again, the SAG may choose to ignore or champion a
particular public health issue to curry favor with voters. Furthermore,
regardless of political motivation, an SAG may, for personal reasons, be
motivated to address a certain public health issue within his or her state.
Finally, SAGs may decide to tackle a particular public health issue because
other SAGs around the country are focusing on a similar issue. SAGs can
simultaneously learn from each other to bring about change in their states and
use their collective presence to stimulate change at the federal level.64 The
most visible example of this occurred in the 1990s, where SAGs across the
United States brought lawsuits against the tobacco industry to recoup Medicaid
costs associated with the treatment of individuals’ smoking-related diseases.65
These mediating factors are primarily understood through an evidence base
consisting of legal or political science research and anecdotal reports about an
SAG’s actions.66
F.

Outputs: Improved Public Health

As path 4 indicates, the mediating factors discussed in the previous section
determine the extent to which an SAG’s use of his or her powers brings about
change that will ultimately improve the public’s health.67 The mediating
factors along the path designated by the number 3 can both augment and
hamper changes to the physical environment, the social environment, and
individuals’ behaviors.68 The results of these changes lead to path 5, improved
public health.69

63. Shannon Frattaroli & Stephen P. Teret, Understanding and Informing Policy
Implementation: A Case Study of the Domestic Violence Provisions of the Maryland Gun
Violence Act, 30 EVALUATION REV. 347, 348 (2006).
64. See generally Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998 (2001).
65. Jon S. Vernick et al., Public Health Benefits of Recent Litigation Against the Tobacco
Industry, 298 JAMA 86, 87 (2007).
66. See infra Part IV.
67. Supra Figure 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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While the outputs section of the logic model holds the greatest promise for
understanding the specific ways in which SAGs may improve the public’s
health, it, unfortunately, lacks a strong evidence base. As this article will
explain, there is currently a dearth of empirical evidence that demonstrates the
association between an SAG’s actions and improved public health. This
scarcity of evidence can, in many instances, be attributed to the fact that the
causal chain connecting an SAG’s actions to improved public health is often
indirect. For example, if an SAG brings a lawsuit that leads to restrictions on
the marketing of cigarettes to young people, it might be extremely difficult to
construct an evaluation plan that could conclusively demonstrate that the
lawsuit itself was associated with reduced youth smoking rates. Several
intermediate steps (e.g., decreases in youth-oriented cigarette advertising;
greater enforcement of minimum age laws to purchase cigarettes; concurrent
but unrelated campaigns designed to lower youth smoking rates) may comprise
the causal chain that leads from an SAG’s action to improved public health.
This highlights the need for methodologically rigorous studies that can
empirically evaluate the connections between SAGs’ activities and improved
public health.
III. PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS ACHIEVED BY SAGS
Because SAGs have diverse powers and tools at their disposal, they can
take a variety of actions intended to protect and promote the public’s health.
As path 3 in Figure 1 demonstrates, an SAG’s approach to a public health issue
is influenced by many factors, including the local legal environment,
advocates’ activities, the SAG’s own priorities, and the actions of other
SAGs.70 The following four cases offer a sample of the types of public health
issues that SAGs have successfully addressed in recent years and, drawing
upon paths 1 and 2 from the logic model, the different powers they have
employed.
A.

Tobacco Control Litigation and the Master Settlement Agreement

Before the mid-1990s, hundreds of people in the United States had sued
the major tobacco manufacturers for damages stemming from their addiction to
cigarettes and resulting health problems, with little success.71 During this
period, the tobacco manufacturers mounted well-financed defense efforts,
disputing the scientific findings that associated smoking with cancer and other
diseases and blaming individuals’ lifestyle choices for their illnesses.72
Because they had extensive financial resources, the tobacco manufacturers

70. Id.
71. Vernick et al., supra note 65, at 86–87.
72. Id.
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“filed every conceivable motion, contested every conceivable issue, took every
imaginable deposition, and demanded every arguably relevant document.”73
This strategy allowed the tobacco companies to drain their opponents’
emotional and financial reserves.
On May 23, 1994, Michael Moore, Mississippi’s Attorney General, took
the first step toward changing the nation’s approach to litigation against the
tobacco companies.74 Moore filed a lawsuit against the tobacco industry to
recoup the costs incurred by Mississippi’s Medicaid program for treating
persons with diseases and conditions related to smoking.75 Unlike previous
cases, Moore’s lawsuit focused on harms to the state (i.e., Medicaid costs)
rather than harms to individuals. He drew on the financial and personnel
resources of the Mississippi Attorney General’s office, and established
contingency fee agreements with attorneys outside the SAG’s office who had
extensive experience with personal injury law.76 These additional attorneys
brought their own financial resources and familiarity with lawsuits against
industries engaging in harmful practices.77
For Moore, the lawsuit involved political risk because he was a Democrat
in a strongly Republican state. Kirk Fordice, Mississippi’s Governor, who had
received re-election support from the tobacco industry,78 attempted to
extinguish Moore’s lawsuit.79 Fordice’s efforts were unsuccessful and the case
was allowed to proceed.80 Although the political climates of the other fortynine states did not uniformly favor litigation against the tobacco industry,
Moore and his colleagues knew that their chance of success would be
“radically augment[ed]” if other SAGs filed similar lawsuits.81 Therefore,
Moore and others “lobbied their colleagues from the state attorneys general’s
offices to file suits as well, in an effort to turn their suit into a nationwide legal
onslaught on the industry.”82 Within a year, Minnesota, Florida, and West
Virginia had filed similar lawsuits.83 Other states increasingly recognized that

73. Steven K. Berenson, Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of Three High
Profile Government Lawsuits, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 457, 463 (2009).
74. ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY 413 (2007).
75. Laurie Fisher, Mississippi: The Unsung Hero of Tobacco Control, USA, 12 CANCER
CAUSES & CONTROL 965, 965 (2001).
76. Berenson, supra note 73, at 463–64.
77. Id. at 464; BRANDT, supra note 74, at 413.
78. BRANDT, supra note 74, at 414.
79. In re Fordice, 691 So.2d 429, 431 (Miss. 1997).
80. BRANDT, supra note 74, at 452.
81. Id. at 415.
82. Id.
83. See State Lawsuits, UCSF LIBR. & CENTER FOR KNOWLEDGE MGMT., http://www.li
brary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/states (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
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this growing collection of lawsuits was sending a strong message to the
tobacco industry, and by 1997, over forty SAGs had brought related lawsuits.84
In light of this wave of litigation, the tobacco industry participated in a
series of secret meetings with tobacco control advocates and several SAGs,
including Moore, to develop a so-called global settlement.85 During this time,
the SAGs of four states—Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas—settled
their lawsuits against the tobacco industry.86 The SAGs of the remaining fortysix states waited to learn about the details of the global settlement.87 In mid1997, the terms of the agreement were announced.88 In essence, the global
settlement “required Congress to grant the tobacco industry limited immunity
from new lawsuits for past actions and to enact certain public health
provisions.”89 John McCain then introduced federal legislation to implement
the settlement.90 Due to a variety of factors, including “lukewarm support
from the Clinton administration, ambivalence on the part of the public health
community, and vigorous opposition from the tobacco industry,”91 the McCain
bill failed.
Several months later, after returning to settlement negotiations with the
tobacco industry, the SAGs announced that a new agreement, known as the
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), had been reached.92 The MSA required
the four major tobacco companies to pay $206 billion to the states over the
course of twenty-five years.93 The states were permitted to use this money
however they chose, and, in exchange, they would drop pending lawsuits
against the tobacco industry.94 Among its many provisions, the MSA
dissolved the industry-supported Tobacco Institute and established the
American Legacy Foundation, which promoted tobacco control activities.95 In
addition, the MSA restricted “the advertising, marketing and promotion of

84. Id.
85. MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, SMOKE IN THEIR EYES 70–77 (2001).
86. Steven A. Schroeder, Tobacco Control in the Wake of the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 294 (2004).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Tobacco, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/tobacco.php (last
visited Apr. 19, 2011).
93. Master Settlement Agreement, People ex rel. Lungren, et al. v. Philip Morris, Inc., et al.,
No. 97AS03031 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 1998), available at http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdf/
1msa.pdf.
94. Id.
95. See Master Settlement Agreement, LEGACY FOR HEALTH, http://www.legacyfor
health.org/25.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
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cigarettes,”96 which included prohibitions against targeting young people and
bans on outdoor cigarette advertising. The MSA did not need federal
implementing legislation, because, unlike the proposed global settlement, it did
not involve subjects that required Congressional approval.97
Once the MSA was officially announced in November 1998, the SAGs of
the forty-six states that had not previously settled were given seven days to
decide whether to participate.98 On November 20, 1998, Thurbert E. Baker,
Georgia’s Attorney General, issued a press release about his decision to
participate in the MSA that reflected the responses of many SAGs:
Our analysis of [the MSA] was based in large part on what we could
realistically hope to achieve under Georgia law through our pending lawsuit,
and what is being offered in the proposed settlement. Quite frankly, there are
many things that this agreement accomplishes, particularly in the public health
99
arena, that we could not achieve through our lawsuit in Georgia.

Ultimately, all forty-six SAGs decided to participate in the MSA.100 The
drafting and acceptance of the MSA demonstrate how multiple SAGs, acting in
concert to take on a particular public health issue or challenge a given industry,
can use litigation as a catalyst to provoke changes that will protect the public’s
health.
B.

Rulemaking to Prevent Firearm-Related Injuries and Deaths

Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that handguns can be designed
to reduce the likelihood that they will cause injuries or deaths.101 For example,
loaded chamber indicators are devices that indicate the presence of
ammunition in a firearm.102 They serve an important purpose, because
semiautomatic pistols “may retain one ammunition round in the firing chamber
after the ammunition magazine has been removed . . . .”103 By letting
individuals know that a round remains in the chamber, loaded chamber
indicators can prevent accidental shootings in which someone incorrectly
assumes that a firearm contains no ammunition. A related device, known as a
magazine safety, can also prevent accidental shootings because it prevents a
96. Tobacco, supra note 92.
97. Berenson, supra note 73, at 468.
98. Id.
99. Press Release, State of Ga. Dep’t of Law, Statement of Attorney General Thurbert Baker
Regarding Georgia’s Tobacco Litigation (Nov. 20, 1998), available at http://www.georgia.gov/
00/press/detail/0,2668,87670814_89151348_89525625,00.htm.
100. Berenson, supra note 73, at 468.
101. Jon S. Vernick et al., Unintentional and Undetermined Firearm Related Deaths: A
Preventable Death Analysis for Three Safety Devices, 9 INJ. PREVENTION 307, 308–09 (2003).
102. Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as
Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1199 (2000).
103. Id.
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gun from firing once its ammunition magazine is removed.104 Magazine
safeties prevent a gun from firing even if ammunition remains in the gun’s
chamber.105
In contrast to other consumer products, the design of handguns is not
subject to federal regulation.106 As a result, the federal government does not
require firearms manufacturers to equip their products with safety features like
In 1996, Scott
loaded chamber indicators and magazine safeties.107
Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, sought to close this
regulatory gap in his state.108
Massachusetts law allows the Attorney General to develop rules and
regulations to address illegal “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”109
Relying on this statutory authority,110 Harshbarger became the first SAG in the
country to promulgate consumer protection regulations requiring firearms to
contain certain safety features.111 Harshbarger explained that these regulations
were meant to “stem the tide of handgun violence in the Commonwealth, and
help make handguns safer for use by law-abiding citizens who purchase them
to protect themselves, their families and their property.”112
The regulations, which apply to handguns sold within Massachusetts, ban
certain “unfair or deceptive practice[s]”113 related to the distribution and design
of handguns. Harshbarger’s regulations include provisions to prohibit the sale
of certain inexpensive, low-quality, compact guns, often referred to as
“Saturday Night Specials.”114 As the regulations explain, these guns are
“prone to repeated firing based on a single pull of the trigger, prone to . . .
explosion . . . during firing with standard ammunition, or prone to accidental
discharge.”115 In addition, the regulations forbid the sale of handguns without

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Stephen P. Teret & Patti L. Culross, Product-Oriented Approaches to Reducing Youth
Gun Violence, 12 FUTURE OF CHILD. 119, 127 (2002).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 128.
109. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (2005).
110. CTR. TO PREVENT HANDGUN VIOLENCE, TARGETING SAFETY: HOW STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL CAN ACT NOW TO SAVE LIVES 4 (2001), available at http://www.bradycenter.org/x
share/pdf/reports/targetingsafety.pdf.
111. Benjamin Bejar, Wielding the Consumer Protection Shield: Sensible Handgun
Regulation in Massachusetts a Paradigm for a National Model?, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 59, 59–60
(1998).
112. Id. at 60.
113. 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.01–16.09 (2008).
114. Bejar, supra note 111, at 59.
115. 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.04 (2008).
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either a loaded chamber indicator or a magazine safety,116 and require
handguns to be child-proofed in a way that “precludes an average five year old
child from operating [them].”117
Almost immediately, several firearms manufacturers and a trade
association, the American Shooting Sports Council, brought a lawsuit in
Massachusetts Superior Court to contest the regulations.118 Among their
allegations, the plaintiffs argued that Harshbarger had “exceeded his authority”
when promulgating the handgun regulations.119 The Superior Court Judge
agreed with this claim, and she issued a preliminary injunction to prevent many
of the new handgun regulations from being enforced.120 Harshbarger appealed
the case to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.121 It is important to
note that during this time, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a law that
mirrored much of the language in Harshbarger’s handgun regulations.122
Therefore, when Harshbarger’s appeal was decided, in June 1999, the Supreme
Judicial Court noted that the Attorney General had the power to regulate in the
area of handguns under both Massachusetts’s consumer protection laws and
under the state’s newly passed gun control legislation.123 As a result, the
injunction was vacated, and the regulations were enforced.124
The actions of the Massachusetts Attorney General paved the way for other
states to pass similar legislation. For example, in 1999, California’s legislature
As in the
passed the Aroner-Scott-Hayden Firearms Safety Act.125
Massachusetts regulations and subsequent legislation, the California law
requires a safety device, such as a trigger lock, to be included with any
handgun sold in the state.126
C. Investigation into Deceptive Food Labeling Practices
In October 2008, a coalition led by food and beverage manufacturers, food
retailers, and scientists announced a new program, known as Smart Choices,

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
128.
126.

940 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.05 (2008).
Id.
Am. Shooting Sports Council v. Attorney Gen., 711 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Mass. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 901–02.
Id. at 902.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121–131 (2007).
Am. Shooting Sports Council, 711 N.E.2d at 904–05.
Id. at 908.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12087–12088.9 (West 1999); Teret & Culross, supra note 106, at
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12088.1 (West 1999).
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which offered front-of-package labeling about an item’s nutritional content.127
This voluntary program used a set of nutritional criteria, including information
about fat, sugar, and sodium content, to determine whether an item could be
deemed a “Smart Choice.”128 Qualifying products could display a front-ofpackage logo indicating the Smart Choices seal of approval along with caloric
information and the number of servings in each package.129 The program’s
creators stated that Smart Choices was “intended to help consumers make
smarter food and beverage choices based on their overall nutritional profile.”130
Shortly after the program was launched in 2009, the Smart Choices logo
began appearing on “sugary processed cereals such as Froot Loops, Cocoa
Krispies and Frosted Flakes” as well as ice creams and mayonnaise.131
Researchers argued that, in essence, “the food industry [had] set its own
nutritional standards and applied a Smart Choices label to products it
considered healthy.”132 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
viewed the Smart Choices program with skepticism, and contacted the
program’s general manager in August 2009.133 In its letter, the FDA explained
that it:
[W]ould be concerned if any [front-of-package] labeling systems used criteria
that were not stringent enough to protect consumers against misleading
claims . . . or had the effect of encouraging consumers to choose highly
processed foods and refined grains instead of fruits, vegetables, and whole
134
grains.

127. Joanne R. Lupton et al., The Smart Choices Front-of-Package Nutrition Labeling
Program: Rationale and Development of the Nutrition Criteria, 91 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION
1078S, 1078S (2010).
128. For Health Professionals, SMART CHOICES PROGRAM, http://www.smartchoicespro
gram.com/professionals.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). As this article went to press, the Smart
Choices Program website could no longer be accessed. A screen capture of the For Health
Professionals section is on file with the Public Law Review.
129. Id.
130. Lupton et al., supra note 127, at 1087S.
131. Richard Blumenthal, Food-Makers Promote Bad Eating Habits, HARTFORD COURANT,
Nov. 10, 2009, http://articles.courant.com/2009-11-10/news/blumenthal-smart-choices.art_1_la
bels-smart-choices-program-big-food.
132. Kelly D. Brownell et al., Personal Responsibility and Obesity: A Constructive Approach
to a Controversial Issue, 29 HEALTH AFF. 379, 385 (2010).
133. Letter from Michael R. Taylor, Senior Advisor to the Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., and Jerold R. Mande, Deputy Under Sec’y for Food Safety, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to
Sarah Krol, Gen. Manager, Smart Choices Program (Aug. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.foodpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/Joint-ltr-FDA-USDA-Krol-8-19-09.pdf.
134. Id.
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While the FDA took no formal action against Smart Choices, it indicated that it
would conduct research to better understand the effectiveness, particularly in
terms of public health benefits, of front-of-package labeling.135
A few months after this exchange, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General
of Connecticut, became frustrated by the Smart Choices program’s “potentially
misleading and deceptive labeling of nutritional value . . . .”136 Because of this
possible deception, Blumenthal initiated an investigation to discern what
scientific evidence had contributed to the labeling of certain “nutritionally
suspect foods,” including “sugar-laden cereals,” as Smart Choices.137
Specifically, Blumenthal sought to determine if the Smart Choices program
had violated Connecticut’s consumer protection laws, which prohibit
misleading and deceptive labeling.138 As part of his investigation, Blumenthal
sent letters to Kellogg’s, General Mills, and PepsiCo, which had voluntarily
implemented the Smart Choices labeling system, to express his concerns about
their participation in the program.139 He noted that the investigation, which
received national media attention, was “ratcheting up pressure for truthful
answers . . . .”140 In an interview, Blumenthal explained that, although he
hoped the companies would voluntarily cooperate with his investigation, he
was willing to use subpoenas, if necessary, to compel production of the
information he had requested.141
On October 20, 2009, within days of the initiation of Blumenthal’s
investigation, Margaret Hamburg, FDA Commissioner, announced that FDA
would renew its focus on front-of-package labels and take action against
“labels that are false or that mislead consumers.”142 She explained that FDA
would draft a regulation that would employ “a single set of science and
nutrition-based criteria” to govern front-of-package labeling.143 When asked

135. Id.
136. Press Release, Office of the Conn. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Investigates “Smart
Choices” Food Labels that Endorse Mayonnaise and Sugary Cereals (Oct. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2341&Q=448880.
137. Id.
138. William Neuman, Connecticut to Scrutinize Food Labels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at
B1, B4.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. How healthy are ‘Smart Choices?’ (NECN television broadcast Oct. 15, 2009), available
at http://www.necn.com/Boston/Health/2009/10/15/How-healthy-are-Smart/1255639423.html.
142. FDA’s Media Briefing on Front-of-Pack Labeling (Oct. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/Newsroom/MediaTranscripts/UCM187809.pdf
(hereinafter FDA’s Media Briefing).
143. Id.; Letter from Barbara O. Schneeman, Dir., Office of Nutrition, Labeling & Dietary
Supplements, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Industry (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.fda.
gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodLabelingNutri
tion/ucm187208.htm.
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what had motivated this decision, Hamburg provided several reasons,
including the Smart Choices program.144 That day, Blumenthal issued a press
release welcoming the FDA’s support of his Smart Choices investigation.145
The Smart Choices program halted its operations on October 23, 2009,
stating that, while it would not forbid food and beverage manufacturers to use
its logo, it would no longer encourage them to do so.146 The program
acknowledged that it was acting in response to the FDA’s announcement
regarding its plan to regulate front-of-package labels.147 In addition, Smart
Choices mentioned that it would cooperate with Blumenthal’s investigation
and would provide him with “information about the development of the
program . . . .”148 Shortly after this increase in state and federal attention to the
Smart Choices program, eight of the largest manufacturers participating in
Smart Choices suspended their use of the program’s logo.149
After the Smart Choices program and its participating manufacturers had
voluntarily ended their allegedly misleading activities, Blumenthal noted that
the combination of his investigation and the FDA’s regulatory action
“mark[ed] the beginning of a strong state and federal enforcement partnership
to stop false food claims . . . .”150 Those with expertise in SAGs’ powers have
heralded this as a prime example of how an SAG can act, using his or her
investigatory powers, to protect the public’s health.151
D. Working with the Federal Government to Address Illegal Marketing of
Pharmaceuticals
In the United States, the FDA, under the auspices of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, “is responsible for protecting the public health by

144. FDA’s Media Briefing, supra note 142.
145. Press Release, Office of the Conn. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Says FDA Will be
Powerful Enforcement Partner in Fighting False Food Labels (Oct. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?Q=449216&A=3673.
146. Press Release, Smart Choices Program, Smart Choices Program Postpones Active
Operations (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.smartchoicesprogram.com/pr_091023_operations.html.
As this article went to press, the Smart Choices Program website could no longer be accessed. A
screen capture of this press release is on file with the Public Law Review.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Press Release, Office of the Conn. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Announces All Food
Manufacturers Agree to Drop Smart Choices Logo (Oc. 29, 2009), available at http://www.ct.
gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=3673&Q=449880; William Neuman, Food Label Program to Suspend
Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B1; Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Kelly D. Brownell,
Advancing Public Health Obesity Policy Through State Attorneys General, 101 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 425 (2011).
150. Blumenthal, supra note 131.
151. State Attorneys General, Nutrition, and Obesity, supra note 54.
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assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of . . . drugs.”152 A drug can only be
sold legally in the United States after it has received FDA’s approval.153
In late 1993, the Warner-Lambert Company received approval from the
FDA to market gabapentin, known commercially as Neurontin, as a drug
therapy for adults with a particular type of epilepsy.154 After a year of sales,
Neurontin had met with modest commercial success by pharmaceutical
standards, with sales revenues of about $100 million.155 Approximately ten
years later, Neurontin’s sales had jumped to almost $3 billion a year, making it
one of the most popular drugs in the United States.156 This spike in sales was
unusual for a drug with limited FDA-approved uses and a relatively static
patient population.
By 2000, ninety percent of Neurontin prescriptions were written for offlabel, or non-FDA-approved, uses including bipolar disorder, migraine
prophylaxis, and the amelioration of certain types of pain.157 Because it is
legal to prescribe a drug for off-label use, the physicians who prescribed
Neurontin for non-FDA-approved uses acted within the bounds of the law.158
It is, however, illegal for pharmaceutical manufacturers to promote a drug for
off-label uses.159
In 1996, David Franklin, once a Warner-Lambert employee, brought an
action against his former employer under the federal False Claims Act.160
Franklin alleged that 1) Warner-Lambert fraudulently promoted Neurontin for
off-label uses; and 2) this illegal marketing campaign caused the submission of
false claims to Medicaid, a program with ties to the federal and state
governments.161 The Medicaid claims were considered “false claims” because,
generally speaking, Medicaid will not provide reimbursement for off-label

152. What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
default.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
153. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
154. Overview: Neurontin, DRUGS @ FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugs
atfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Search_Drug_Name (search Neurontin; then follow # 020235
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
155. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 103 (D. Mass. 2007).
156. Id.
157. Michael A. Steinman et al., The Promotion of Gabapentin: An Analysis of Internal
Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 284, 284, 287, 293 (2006).
158. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351 (2001) (citing Michael D.
Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88
GEO. L.J. 2119, 2133 (2000) (“Physicians may prescribe drugs and devices for off-label uses.”).
159. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006).
160. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D. Mass. 2001).
The False Claims Act allows an individual to bring a lawsuit, on behalf of the federal
government, against a person or entity that has knowingly caused the federal government to
receive false claims for payments. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730 (2006).
161. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
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drug use.162 Franklin estimated that, during his time at Warner-Lambert,
twenty-five percent of Neurontin’s sales were wrongly reimbursed by the
federal government because they were for off-label uses.163 In addition,
Franklin alleged that Warner-Lambert went to great lengths to hide its off-label
marketing activities from the FDA.164
While the federal government pursued the Franklin litigation, several
SAGs announced their plans to investigate Warner-Lambert’s off-label
marketing of Neurontin to determine whether the company had violated state
consumer protection laws.165 Hardy Myers, Attorney General of Oregon, was
one of the leaders of this investigation.166
On May 13, 2004, Warner-Lambert reached a settlement with the federal
and state governments, “in conjunction with [a guilty plea] to federal criminal
charges of violating the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.”167 The settlement
announcement explained that “Warner-Lambert’s strategic marketing plans, as
well as other evidence, show that Neurontin was aggressively marketed to treat
a wide array of ailments for which the drug was not approved . . . . WarnerLambert promoted Neurontin even when scientific studies had shown it was
not effective.”168 As a consequence of the settlement, Warner-Lambert agreed
to pay over $430 million to the federal and state governments.169 This
included payment for criminal fines, restitution to the states’ Medicaid
programs, and SAGs’ costs incurred while conducting their investigations.170
The settlement also included provisions for the creation and funding of a
program to educate consumers and prescribers about the marketing of drugs,171
and the establishment of an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, which

162. Id. at 44−45.
163. Id. at 45.
164. Id.
165. Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Warner-Lambert Co. LLC (May 13, 2004),
available at http://www.consumerprescribergrantprogram.org/files/Assurance_of_Voluntary_
Compliance.pdf.
166. Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, Myers Announces Prescription Drug Education
Grants (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/2006/rel110106.shtml.
167. Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, AG Announces $430 Million Global Settlement
Against Warner-Lambert, a Subsidiary of Pfizer (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.doj.
state.or.us/releases/2004/rel051704.shtml.
168. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Warner Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve
Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See THE CONSUMER & PRESCRIBER GRANT PROGRAM, http://www.consumerprescriber
grantprogram.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2011); Order Governing Administration of Multistate
Grant and Advertising Program, In re Warner-Lambert Co., LLC, No. 04C14403 (Or. Cir. Ct.
May 13, 2004).
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prohibited Warner-Lambert “from deceptive and misleading pharmaceutical
marketing practices in the future.”172 Because Oregon’s Attorney General had
spearheaded the states’ investigation, he was designated as the SAG
responsible for overseeing the implementation of the consumer and prescriber
education program.173
The Warner-Lambert settlement is notable for several reasons, including
its multi-million dollar figure and its resolution of multiple actions and claims
made by the federal and state governments. While several SAGs drew upon
either their consumer protection or Medicaid fraud resources, Oregon and
Florida’s SAGs employed a novel approach by using both their consumer
protection and Medicaid fraud units during the Warner-Lambert investigation
and settlement negotiations.174 This settlement marked the first time a
pharmaceutical-marketing case was jointly settled by the federal Department of
Justice and the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units in
concert with SAGs’ consumer protection divisions.175
IV. SAGS’ EFFECTIVENESS IN PROMOTING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH
To date, SAGs’ efforts to improve the public’s health have not been
extensively studied. While legal and political science researchers have clearly
explained what powers are available to SAGs, as summarized in paths 1 and 2
of the logic model in Figure 1, little evidence exists to demonstrate how, from
an empirical perspective, these powers have been employed to improve the
public’s health.
Brief examples of SAGs’ effectiveness in promoting the public’s health
have appeared in the scholarly literature through review articles or anecdotal
reports.176 Some SAGs, or their close colleagues, have provided an insider’s
view of successful public health endeavors by publishing first-hand accounts
of their work. In 1997, Craig R. Mayton, an assistant Attorney General in
Ohio, wrote an article for Health Affairs detailing his approach, along with
Ohio’s Attorney General, Betty D. Montgomery, to the conversion of nonprofit health care institutions into for-profit entities.177 Mayton explained that,
as an assistant SAG, he sought to ensure that, as part of the conversion process,
the “full value of the [hospital’s] non-profit assets [were] preserved for the
community.”178 Specifically, his office worked to determine whether a non-

172. Press Release, supra note 167.
173. Order Governing Administration of Multistate Grant and Advertising Program, supra
note 171.
174. Press Release, supra note 167.
175. Id.
176. See infra Part IV.
177. Craig R. Mayton, The View from Ohio, 16 HEALTH AFF. 92, 92 (1997).
178. Id.
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profit hospital’s charitable assets were being purchased for “full and fair value”
by a for-profit entity and whether the proceeds from this purchase would be
“applied to proper charitable purposes,” such as the creation of a charitable
foundation to address health care needs in the affected community.179 Mayton
discussed several ways in which Ohio’s Attorney General approached this
issue, including litigation and support of legislation to clarify the conversion
process and the conveyance of a non-profit hospital’s charitable assets.180
Review articles in the legal literature have provided overviews of SAGs’
successful public health efforts. For example, in a 2002 article for the
Oklahoma City University Law Review, W.A. Drew Edmondson, former
Attorney General of Oklahoma, reviewed SAGs’ attempts to improve end-oflife care.181 He explained that, during his time as President of the National
Association of Attorneys General, he developed and promoted an initiative
“focused on the current and emerging role of Attorneys General in protection
of consumers of health care near the end of [their] lives.”182 To illustrate the
scope of this initiative, he mentioned two SAGs.183 First, Edmondson
discussed the “positive policy environment” for end-of-life issues established
by Maryland Attorney General Joseph Curran, Jr.184 He noted that Curran
“maintain[ed] proper law enforcement focus, [did] not overburden good
practitioners, and bolster[ed] advocates for better pain management.”185
Edmondson then turned to the efforts of Rhode Island Attorney General
Sheldon Whitehouse, which included the co-sponsorship of conferences about
end-of-life issues with multiple stakeholders, the establishment of a task force
to assess end-of-life care recommendations, and the creation of a medical-legal
steering committee charged with improving Rhode Island’s end-of-life care
laws.186
Some researchers have used qualitative research methodologies, such as
the case study approach, to better understand how SAGs can contribute to the
development of health policy. For example, in 1984, Ronald C. Lippincott
conducted a case study to explore the role of SAGs in bringing antitrust
lawsuits, with a focus on lawsuits targeting health care institutions that had
engaged in practices to limit competition.187 The case study, which was

179. Id.
180. Id. at 94–95.
181. See W. A. Drew Edmondson, Improving End-of-Life Care: The Role of Attorneys
General, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 911 (2002).
182. Id. at 911–12.
183. Id. at 914–15.
184. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
185. Id. at 914.
186. Id. at 915.
187. Ronald C. Lippincott, Redressing the Imbalanced Political Market for Health Policy: A
Role for the State Attorney General?, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 389 (1984).
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grounded in political science theory, was situated in Ohio, because during the
1970s, William J. Brown, Ohio’s Attorney General, had filed seven antitrust
lawsuits against health care institutions, making the state “a leader in this
area.”188 Lippincott found that, as an SAG, Brown’s “ultimate interest was
electoral survival, [and his] strategy was to model the Attorney General’s
Office on a public interest law firm which advocated the consumer interests of
Ohio’s citizens. Health care was perceived as a salient consumer issue . . . .”189
In addition, Brown and his political advisors had determined that “although
[the antitrust] actions might jeopardize future political support from the health
industry, such losses were perceived minimal . . . . [H]ealth providers were not
his natural constituency.”190 Given the beneficial outcomes of Brown’s
antitrust enforcement activities for consumers, Lippincott concluded that
antitrust law provided one tool that an SAG could successfully draw upon to
protect the public’s health.191 Lippincott underscored, however, that Brown’s
motivation to enter the health policy arena was driven in large part by political
considerations related to his chances of reelection.192
Finally, statistical modeling has been employed to study how SAGs have
worked together to tackle public health issues, particularly in the context of
tobacco litigation. In 2003, Thomas A. Schmeling published a study in which
he used collective action theory to guide the creation of statistical models that
tested hypotheses about SAGs’ cooperation while litigating against the tobacco
industry.193 Schmeling suggested that the litigation that ultimately led to the
Master Settlement Agreement with the major tobacco companies in 1998 can
“be best understood not as forty-two SAGs independently trying to win at trial
against the tobacco companies, but as an effort to bring enough resources to
bear to force the companies to settle to avoid the cost and uncertainty of
litigation.”194
After conducting an event-history analysis, Schemling concluded that
SAGs’ apparent coordination in suing the tobacco industry between 1994 and
1998 “emerged from a process of interdependent decision-making, in which
the SAGs influenced each other as each observed and reacted to the decisions
of the rest.”195 In addition, Schemling found that the heterogeneity of SAGs’
political environments contributed to cooperation among SAGs affiliated with

188. Id. at 391. The case study was grounded in political science theory. Id.
189. Id. at 393.
190. Id. at 402.
191. Id. at 402–03.
192. Id. at 403.
193. Thomas A. Schmeling, Stag Hunting with the State AG: Anti-Tobacco Litigation and the
Emergence of Cooperation Among State Attorneys General, 25 LAW & POL’Y 429 (2003).
194. Id. at 433.
195. Id. at 450 (emphasis omitted).
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different political parties.196 Specifically, he suggested that the many lawsuits
initiated by Democratic SAGs likely served as a motivator for Republican
SAGs, who, for political reasons, may have been less motivated to sue the
tobacco industry.197 This, in turn, led to actual and perceived bipartisan
cooperation, which may have stimulated other SAGs to participate in the
lawsuits.198
V. SAGS’ CURRENT AND FUTURE ABILITY TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH
SAGs have repeatedly used their powers, in both traditional and novel
ways, to improve the public’s health. To better understand SAGs’ current and
future ability to improve the public’s health, several types of information are
needed. First, the research base that empirically demonstrates the association
between SAGs’ efforts and improved public health must be expanded. This
requires two evaluative approaches.
The first should involve studies that assess the utility of the varied powers
available to SAGs. There is a compelling need for a state-by-state survey of
SAGs’ existing powers, with a standardized ranking system to indicate the
strength of different powers to improve the public’s health. Using a mixed
methods approach, this type of national mapping study could then be
supplemented with a series of case studies to better understand how, in states
with stronger powers, SAGs have acted to protect the public’s health.
Additional types of quantitative or qualitative work could help to explain how
states with stronger SAG powers have fared relative to states with weaker SAG
powers for specific public health problems (e.g., do SAGs with stronger
powers draw on them more frequently to tackle public health issues than SAGs
in states with weaker powers; are certain powers deployed in a uniform way
across states to address a particular public health problem?). The second
evaluative approach would involve the selection of a specific public health
policy promoted by an SAG and an assessment of the policy’s effectiveness,
given the SAG’s intended public health goals. These complementary
approaches would provide information about SAGs’ varied powers and about
SAGs’ approaches to particular public health issues.
The second way to develop a better understanding of SAGs’ ability to
improve the public’s health involves the examination of SAGs’ perceived
public health victories and failures. This article provides examples of SAGs’
perceived victories in the areas of tobacco control, firearms regulation, food
policy, and off-label marketing of drugs. Much can also be learned from
examining instances in which an SAG has tried, unsuccessfully, to tackle a
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particular public health issue. Although the public health community may
initially perceive these instances as failures, they can provide important insight
for SAGs as they strategize and plan their future public health endeavors.
One widely publicized, and unsuccessful, public health effort by an SAG
began in 1999 when Sheldon Whitehouse, Rhode Island’s Attorney General,
brought a lawsuit against lead pigment manufacturers and a trade
association.199 On behalf of the state of Rhode Island, Whitehouse argued that
the defendants were responsible for creating a public nuisance, due to the
health hazards associated with exposure to residential paint that contained
lead.200 In 2006, a jury found the defendants guilty, making this case “the first
time in the United States that a trial resulted in a verdict that imposed liability
on lead pigment manufacturers for creating a public nuisance.”201 Initially, this
seemed to introduce a novel legal theory that SAGs could draw upon to protect
the public’s health, particularly because the defendants would have been
required “to pay billions of dollars to clean up contaminated homes.”202
However, in 2008, following an appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
overturned the jury’s verdict, after concluding that the SAG’s lawsuit had not
met each element required for a successful claim of public nuisance.203
While this lawsuit did not benefit the public’s health, it provided useful
lessons to SAGs in other states who were contemplating, or in the midst of,
similar lawsuits.204 Rhode Island’s Supreme Court noted that public nuisance
remained “a legally viable cause of action,”205 meaning that it could one day be
effectively applied to a different area of public health, in which the facts of the
case more favorably met the public nuisance criteria.
This finding proved helpful to other SAGs. For example, in 2009,
Indiana’s Attorney General brought a lawsuit against two landlords who, he
alleged, had ignored warnings from their county health department to engage
in lead paint abatement.206 This lawsuit offered a new twist on a public
nuisance theory of liability, since it was brought to force landlords to comply
with their duties to their tenants.207 If successful, this case could provide other

199. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n Inc., 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008).
200. Id. at 434.
201. Id.
202. Abha Bhattarai, Rhode Island Court Throws Out Jury Finding in Lead Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/business/02paint.html.
203. Lead Indus. Ass’n Inc., 951 A.2d at 452–58.
204. Bhattarai, supra note 202.
205. Lead Indus. Ass’n Inc., 951 A.2d at 445.
206. Press Release, Office of the Ind. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Zoeller Files Suit to
Correct Lead-Paint Hazard (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.ai.org/attorneygeneral/press/
Suit.filed.to.correct.lead-paint.hazard.html.
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SAGs with a promising model for the use of public nuisance theory in
litigation related to lead paint and other public health issues.
When SAGs contemplate their approach to a public health issue, they must
decide which of their powers to employ. As the Rhode Island case
demonstrates, although a power like litigation may seem promising, it may not
ultimately be successful. In light of this realization, SAGs are increasingly
balancing the threat or use of litigation against the exercise of other powers,
such as rule-making, or the employment of their bully pulpit. With the
promulgation of a rule or regulation, an SAG can comprehensively address a
public health issue and possibly avoid engaging in several rounds of litigation
with multiple defendants. On the other hand, legal challenges may arise to an
SAG’s authority to promulgate a particular regulation, as occurred in the case
of Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger and his gun control
regulations.208 While Harshbarger successfully defended his authority to
develop and enforce these regulations, the lawsuit exemplifies the types of
legal hurdles that an SAG may face when engaging in rule-making.209
Some SAGs have, in recent years, made greater use of their bully pulpit to
protect the public’s health. After the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement with
the tobacco industry, Joseph Curran, Maryland’s Attorney General, remained
concerned that, despite the MSA’s strict prohibitions of tobacco companies’
efforts to place their products in the media, smoking and tobacco products,
including brand names, continued to be featured in movies.210 Curran, along
with twenty-seven other SAGs, wrote a letter in 2003 to Jack Valenti,
President of the Motion Picture Association of America, asking the film
industry to “reduc[e] the depiction of smoking in movies.”211 This led to a
series of conversations involving SAGs, film industry executives, and tobacco
control researchers. One result of this dialog was a pledge from the Directors
Guild of America to “create antismoking public service announcements” that
could be played in movie theaters before films that featured smoking.212

208. See supra Part III.B.
209. See id.
210. NAT’L CANCER INST., THE ROLE OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA IN PROMOTING OR
DISCOURAGING TOBACCO USE 415 (Ronald M. Davis et al. eds., 2008), available at http://cancer
control.cancer.gov/tcrb/monographs/19/m19_complete.pdf.
211. Id. at 415, 419.
212. Id. at 417. SAGs have worked on multiple fronts to address the issue of smoking in
movies. For example, due to the work of the Maryland AG’s Office, the Weinstein Company
became the first motion picture company to provide anti-smoking public service announcements,
created by the American Legacy Foundation’s “truth” campaign, with any DVD that included
depictions of smoking. See, e.g., Letter from J. Joseph Curran, Attorney Gen. of Md., et al., to
Bob and Harvey Weinstein, The Weinstein Company (Sept. 5, 2006) (on file with author); Press
Release, Md. Attorney Gen, Curran Announces That the Weinstein Company Will Add AntiSmoking PSA’s to Newest DVD Release (Oct. 24, 2006), available at http://www.oag.state.md.
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Curran and his colleagues did not use any of their formal powers as SAGs to
accomplish this. Instead, they used the clout of their collective request to sway
the movie industry.
To brainstorm approaches to urgent public health issues, SAGs can
capitalize on the cachet of their office and invite public health and other
experts to convene. For example, in February 2010, William Sorrell,
Vermont’s Attorney General, held a summit as part of “a new initiative to
identify and develop actions to reduce obesity in Vermont.”213 This meeting
included experts in food and obesity policy, nutrition, and state and federal
physical activity programs.214 As a result of the summit, working groups were
formed to focus on diverse aspects of obesity control efforts.215 Going
forward, Sorrell will work with these groups to determine the best ways in
which his office can address obesity.
By recognizing mutually beneficial opportunities, SAGs can leverage their
own efforts to bring about even greater public health protections. These
opportunities may arise in a variety of contexts. For instance, SAGs can work
with their state legislatures to promulgate regulations that complement recently
passed legislation. If SAGs work with their SAG colleagues in other states to
take on a particular public health issue, they can use their collective power to
impact policy-making at the federal level. While the Master Settlement
Agreement, which involved forty-six SAGs, offers the most well-known
example of this type of collaboration,216 smaller groups of SAGs can wield
significant influence on the federal government’s approach to a public health
issue, particularly if they can provide examples of their own state’s successful
efforts. Finally, borrowing from the concepts behind social mobilization
theory,217 SAGs can respond to the demands of existing grassroots coalitions,
such as the environmental protection movement, with the understanding that
these groups are likely to provide strong support for the development and
implementation of policies that correspond to their agendas.

us/Press/2006/102406.htm; Letter from J. Joseph Curran, Attorney Gen. of Md., et al., to Bob and
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2011).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra Part III.A.
217. DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 217–
27 (2002).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011] POTENTIAL FOR STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO PROMOTE PUBLIC HEALTH

297

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING SAGS’ ABILITY TO IMPROVE THE
PUBLIC’S HEALTH
Due to their wide-ranging powers, connections to multiple government
actors, and ability to act in concert, SAGs are uniquely positioned to protect
and promote the public’s health. By developing a better understanding of
SAGs’ extensive abilities, public health professionals can take steps to
contribute to SAGs’ public health efforts. The creation of a more synergistic
relationship between SAGs and the public health community would foster
mutually beneficial goals, such as the translation of research into policy.
By sharing their research with SAGs and summarizing the relevant work of
other researchers, public health professionals can provide an evidence base that
will drive SAGs to take action. For example, on September 21, 2009, five
researchers with expertise in substance abuse sent a letter to the three SAG cochairs of the NAAG Youth Access to Alcohol Committee “in response to the
concerns raised by State law enforcement officials regarding the safety of
caffeinated alcoholic beverages.”218 After providing an evidence-based
presentation of the problem and summarizing the empirical research base, the
researchers explained that:
[T]here is no general consensus among health professionals and the scientific
research community that the use of caffeine in alcoholic beverages has been
demonstrated to be safe. On the contrary, the consumption of caffeinated
alcoholic beverages has been associated with increased risk of serious injury to
oneself and to others, as the result of driving while intoxicated, sexual assault,
219
and other dangerous behaviors.

The letter was accompanied by a list of references that included the studies the
researchers had mentioned, as well as relevant literature reviews and citations
for additional empirical work that had examined the health effects associated
with caffeinated alcoholic drinks.220 A week later, the three SAG co-chairs
and fifteen additional SAGs sent a letter, which included the researchers’
original letter as an attachment, to the Commissioner of the FDA to express
concern about the rise of caffeinated alcoholic beverages.221 The SAGs’ letter
repeatedly referenced the substance abuse researchers’ findings, noting that
“experts in the field agree that the use of caffeine added to alcohol poses a

218. Letter from Amelia M. Arria, Assoc. Dir., Ctr. for Substance Abuse Research, et al., to
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney Gen. of Conne, Mark Shurtleff, Attorney Gen. of Utah, and Alicia
G. Limtiaco, Attorney Gen. of Guam (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/down
loads/Food/FoodIngredientsPackaging/UCM190372.pdf.
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significant public health threat . . . .”222 Several weeks later, the FDA launched
an investigation into the safety and health issues associated with caffeinated
alcoholic beverages.223 In a press release, the FDA noted that eighteen SAGs
had contacted the agency regarding concerns about caffeinated alcoholic
beverages.224 In November 2010, the FDA determined that caffeine was “an
unsafe food additive” when combined with alcoholic beverages.225 The four
beverage makers that FDA targeted have all ceased the production and
shipment of caffeinated alcoholic beverages.226
As this example demonstrates, SAGs use research to guide and strengthen
their efforts to protect the public’s health. Public health professionals can
share their findings by contacting SAGs directly or by seeking out
opportunities to present at NAAG events. NAAG hosts three formal meetings
a year for all SAGs, which are supplemented by additional workshops and
smaller gatherings.227 For those whose research involves public health law and
policy, NAAG meetings present a chance to educate SAGs about innovative
ways to protect the public’s health, such as using existing consumer protection
powers to regulate in previously ignored areas.
To ensure a bi-directional exchange of information, public health
professionals should invite SAGs to share their experiences through conference
presentations or brief journal articles. By communicating directly with the
public health community, SAGs can educate public health professionals about
areas in need of an evidence base. This, in turn, can stimulate new public
health research, which can strengthen SAGs’ public health efforts.
222. Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Attorney Gen. of Conn., Mark Shurtleff, Attorney Gen.
of Utah, and Alicia G. Limtiaco, Attorney Gen. of Guam, to Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Food/FoodIngredientsPackaging/UCM190371.pdf. This letter represented the culmination of
work that began in 2007 by SAGs who were concerned about caffeinated alcoholic beverages.
This work included, inter alia, consultations with public health experts as well as multiple
presentations by SAGs to stakeholder groups. See, e.g., Press Release, Md. Attorney Gen.,
Attorneys General Say Anheuser-Busch Irresponsibly Targets Youth with Alcohol Energy Drinks
(May 11, 2007), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2007/051107.htm; Letter from
Troy King, Attorney Gen. of Ala., et al., to Hon. John J. Manfreda, Adm’r, Alcohol & Tobacco
Tax & Trade Bureau, Re: Sparks Brand Alcoholic Energy Drinks (Feb. 21, 2008) (on file with
author).
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Alcoholic Beverages (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
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By engaging in research to better understand and analyze SAGs’ public
health successes and failures, public health professionals can develop
knowledge to bolster SAGs’ future efforts. The logic model in Figure 1
provides a useful organizational tool for identifying the types of studies that
should be conducted.228 Paths 1 and 2 denote the different types of powers that
SAGs can use to improve the public’s health (e.g., litigation and law
enforcement; investigative activities; law and policy reform). Although the
research base is far from exhaustive, legal and political science scholars have
studied these powers and their execution. Moreover, little empirical work has
been conducted to better understand the mediating factors that follow Path 3.229
A handful of studies have addressed mediating factors,230 such as an SAG’s
concerns about reelection or how the actions of SAGs throughout the nation
can influence other SAGs.
Future research about the factors that mediate SAGs’ efforts to improve the
public’s health might involve case studies. Because SAGs’ powers vary
among the states, and each SAG operates in a unique political climate, case
studies can offer important insights into how a particular SAG approached a
given public health issue. Multiple case studies can be conducted to capitalize
on findings that may be revealed during so-called natural experiments. These
experiments may arise when SAGs use different powers to address the same
public health issue (e.g., regulation versus litigation to combat lead paint).
Research devoted to studying Paths 4 and 5231—namely the outputs that
constitute improved public health in light of SAGs’ actions—is largely lacking.
A variety of study designs could be employed to fill this gap. For example,
researchers can employ mapping studies to understand how SAGs throughout
the United States have used their powers to take on a specific public health
issue. These types of studies can also assess the extent to which SAGs’
interventions are being enforced. In addition, statistical modeling can be used
to empirically assess the effects of SAGs’ efforts on public health outcomes.
Finally, for areas in which the public health impacts of an SAG’s actions are
unclear, researchers can use health impact assessments to help SAGs
appreciate the extent to which their actions will help or harm the public’s
health.

228. Supra Figure 1.
229. Supra Figure 1.
230. These include Lippincott’s theoretically grounded case study that explores the role of
SAGs in bringing antitrust lawsuits and Schmeling’s event history analysis of SAGs’ involvement
in the lawsuits that led to the Master Settlement Agreement. See supra notes 187–198 and
accompanying text.
231. Supra Figure 1.
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VII. CONCLUSION
SAGs have tremendous potential to protect and promote the public’s
health. Although they have a broad grant of authority and a wide range of
powers to draw upon, SAGs’ abilities are not well understood by public health
professionals. Yet, through both formal and informal powers, SAGs have
repeatedly brought innovative approaches to well-entrenched public health
issues. Acting alone, an SAG can influence a public health issue in his or her
own state, but SAGs can also act together to bring about change at the federal
level. By learning more about SAGs’ public health successes and failures,
public health professionals can develop a better understanding of how to
collaborate, through research or practice efforts, with these promising partners.

